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McDonald: Expert Testimony in Automobile Accident Cases

EXPERT TESTIMONY IN AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT CASES
Approximately seventy-five percent of the civil cases tried
today involve automobiles. A primary consideration in deciding
these cases is the speed at which the vehicles were traveling at
the time of the accident. Of the ways in which evidence of speed
can be presented to a jury, one method now widely accepted is
to allow an expert to give his opinion of speed based upon the
physical evidence found at the scene.1 South Carolina first
allowed this kind of testimony in 1963 in Doremus v. Atlantic
2
Coast Line Railroad.
Although this case seemed to open the
door for the continued and widespread use of opinion evidence
in accident cases, it raised a number of questions and left the
open doorway covered with a curtain of uncertainty. The purpose of this note is to examine this case and decisions from
other jurisdictions in light of the questions raised by Doremus
to determine what the South Carolina position might be.
I. GENEPAL LAW

A. Expert Testimony
A fundamental rule of evidence is that a witness must testify
as to fact and not opinion; any inferences or conclusions which
may be drawn from the facts are for the jury. An exception
to this rule is allowed when the subject matter in question is
of a unique nature and beyond the comprehension of the average
layman. 4 Under these circumstances an expert is allowed to
draw inferences from the facts and offer conclusions to the
jury in the form of an opinion. 5 Two elements are required in
order that such testimony may be admitted:
First, the subject of the inference must be so distinctively
related to some science, profession, business or occupation
as to be beyond the ken of the average layman and second,
the witness must have such skill, knowledge or experience
in that field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion
1.
2.
3.
4.

Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 112 (1952).
242 S.C. 123, 130 S.E2d 370 (1963).
See, e.g., McCown v. Muldrow, 91 S.C. 523, 74 S.E. 386 (1912).
31 Am. JuR. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 16 (1967).

5. Id.
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or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for
truth.6

These two criteria are particularly meaningful when applied
to the subject of this paper.
B. Empert Opinions Basecd on Skid Marks
The physical evidence of speed found at the scene of an accident has always been deemed a proper subject for consideration
by the jury.7 The controversy in this area is concerned with
whether the jury should be guided in its evaluation of these
elements. One of these indicia, skid marks, is particularly susceptible to scientific interpretation.8 In spite of this, many
jurisdictions, until fairly recently, were reluctant to allow any
comment on the physical evidence introduced, leaving the interpretation of this evidence entirey to the jury.9 Two lines of
reasoning favoring this practice appear in the cases. Some courts
felt than any comment or opinion on the relationship between
the length of the marks and the speed of the vehicle would be a
usurpation of the jury's function of deciding ultimate issues.' 0
The second reason, which is essentially a part of the first, is
that this relationship is not beyond the comprehension of the
average juror;" i.e., the average man is familiar with the speed
required to create skid marks of a given length.
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions now recognize
the fallacy of this reasoning, and allow experts in the field to
explain the relationship between the length of the skid marks
and the speed of the vehicle in question. 12 The proposition was
well stated by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma:
While a layman knows that a speeding car will produce
skid marks upon a pavement when brakes are applied, and
while it is a scientific fact that the speed of a motor vehicle
6. C. McCoPziicx, HAxnooK OF THE LAW oF EVmENCE § 13 (1954).
7. 9c D. BLASnFiELD, CYCLoPEDIA oF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 6233 (perm. ed. W. Bandy 1954).
8. Ruther v. Tyra, 207 Okla. 112, 247 P2d 964 (1952).
9. See Annot., 70 A.L.R. 540 (1931).
10. E.g., Thornburg v. Maley, 242 Ia. 70, 45 N.W.2d 576 (1951).
11. E.g., Richardson v. Lovvorn, 199 Va. 688, 101 S.E.2d 511 (1958).
12. E.g., Stanley v. Hayes, 276 Ala. 532, 165 So. 2d 84 (1964); Anglin v.
Nichols, 80 Ariz. 346, 297 P.2d 932 (1956) ; Jobe v. Harold Livestock Comm'n
Co., 113 Cal. App. 2d 269. 247 P.2d 951 (1952) ; Andrews v. Moery, 205 Okla.
635, 240 P.2d 447 (1951)'; Knight v. Borgan, 52 Wash. 2d 219, 324 P.2d 797
(1958).
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can be closely approximated from the skid marks and other
physical facts at the scene of the collision, the method of
computing such speed from the physical facts is not a matter of common knowledge. Such computation can be made
only by an expert who has given special study to the
13
subject.
Of course a witness is never allowed to give an opinion as to
who is responsible for an accident 14 as this is tke ultimate issue
in an accident case. The majority decisions do not change this
rule; they merely say that the speed of the vehicles involved
should not be considered as an ultimate issue before the court.1 5
It seems that any reluctance to accept this practice based
upon the feeling that it tends to encroach upon established rules
would be overshadowed by its practical advantages. Frequently,
there are no eyewitnesses to an automobile accident. When this
is the case the only evidence of speed available to the jury is
physical, usually in the form of skid marks, scrapes or cuts in
the pavement and, of course, the damaged vehicles. Even through
the scientific application of the speed-skid mark relationship
the exat speed of the vehicle can never be determined. 16 Unknown factors such as brake pressure, gear drag, changes in
weight, etc., all have some bearing on the length of the marks
produced. 1'7 Generally expert opinions of speed are stated in
terms of the minimum speed at which the vehicle could have
been traveling. Expressed in these terms the determination can
be surprisingly accurate. Considering the variety of the physical
facts which might be put before the jury, and the number of
unknown factors which are involved in determining speed, the
value of having someone trained in these matters to aid the
jury in its determination can be readily seen. Even when there
are eyewitnesses, the expert can still be valuable by giving the
jury a reliable standard with which the witnesses' statements
can be compared. Their estimates are often expressed in general
terms and may have been formed after only a limited observation of the vehicle. More importantly, the witness may not be
a competent judge of speed.
13. Ruther v. Tyra, 207 Okla. 112, 247 P2d 964, 967 (1952).
14. 31 Am. Jun. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 148 (1967).
15. Bonner v. Polacari, 350 F.2d 493 (10th Cir. 1965).
16. Cook, Speed Calculations and the Expert Witness, 42 NEE. L. REV. 10O
(1962). This article deals at length with the scientific and mathematical formulas used in computing speed from skid marks.
17. Id.
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It is interesting to note at this point that at least two states,
Alabama and Wisconsin, have recognized the value of expert
testimony based on skid marks since 1920.18
II. Trm SoUTH

CAROLINA PosITIoN

A. Background
Prior to 1963, the South Carolina Supreme Court had refused
to allow expert testimony of speed. The position is contained in
two cases, Thompson v. South CarolinaState Highway Depart° It is apparent from the opinment1 9 and Willard v. MfCoy.2
ions that the methods used to compute speed in these two cases
were not the best examples of the technique. In Thompson a
highway patrolman "was permitted to testify as to the speed
the car . . .was being driven . . ., applying some formula to

the distance it traveled and the number of times it turned
over....,,21 In Willard a patrolman gave the following testimony: "I have a steel tape and I measured he was going eighty
miles or better." 22 Although in each of these cases the court was
clearly justified in refusing to admit the proffered testimony
because of the circumstances involved, the general tenor of the
two opinions went further, and indicated a clear and decisive
refusal to accept all opinions of highway patrolmen (and presumably any other experts), and not just those which might
be illogically founded or unscientific.
[A] highway patrolman who did not see the car in motion
is no more competent to judge the speed of such car than
the average man sitting on the jury.... We have heretofore
remarked, in at least one opinion, that the testimony of
highway patrolmen should be limited, when they are not
eyewitnesses, to markings on the highway, etc., and it is
for the jury to reach a conclusion concerning the issue
23
which is sought to be proven or rebutted thereby.
18. See Jackson v. Vaughn, 204 Ala. 543, 86 So. 469 (1920); Luethe v.

Schmidt-Gaertner Co., 170 Wis. 590, 176 N.W. 63 (1920).
19. 224 S.C. 338, 79 S.E.2d 160 (1953).
20. 234 S.C. 317, 108 S.E.2d 113 (1959).
21. Thompson v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 224 S.C. 338, 342,
79 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1953).
22. Willard v. McCoy, 234 S.C. 317, 319, 108 S.E.2d 113, 114 (1959).
23. Thompson v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 224 S.C. 338, 342,
79 S.E.2d 160, 162-63 (1953).
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B. Doremus v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
The question came before our court again in the 1963 case of
Doremus 'v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad.24 The circumstances
here were vastly different from the previous cases and should
be considered in some detail. The plaintiff, an infant, was injured when the car in which he was riding collided with the
defendant's train at a crossing. Testimony was given by Sergeant (now Captain) Billy E. Fallaw of the highway patrol
concerning the relationship between the skid marks and the
speed of the car. Captain Fallaw had, at the time of the trial,
been a member of the patrol for twenty-four years; and, during
the last eighteen of those years he had been connected with the
patrol's Driver Education Program. During this time Captain
Fallaw had conducted a comprehensive series of tests dealing
with the relationship between skid marks and speed, utilizing
a variety of vehicles under various road and weather conditions.
He had examined the scene of the collision and his testimony
revealed that he had conducted tests using the same make of
car as the plaintiff's, similarly equipped and on similar road
surfaces. Captain Fallaw testified that these tests revealed
that in order to leave skid marks of ninety-five feet, the length
of the marks in question, the car would be traveling at forty
miles per hour when the brakes were set. Other evidence revealed that the plaintiff's car had been stopped or nearly
stopped when hit by the train.
In holding that Captain Fallaw's testimony was proper the
supreme court did two things. First, they distinguished the
Thompson and Willard cases because there the opinions were
"based, not on skid marks or previous tests, but on completely
different factors." 5 This was largely true although skid marks
formed some basis for the opinions in both cases; presumably
that is what was measured with the steel tape in Tillard and in
Thompson the patrolman had testified as to the length of the
marks. At any rate, the methods and techniques used in these
cases were hardly as precise or scientific as those in Doremus,
nor were the experts so well qualified.
What the court seemed to be doing then was overruling the
general view of these cases and implying that when an expert
24. 242 S.C. 123, 130 S.E.2d 370 (1963). See also J. DiXsFR, A Gum. To
EVIDENCE LAW IN SoUTH CAROLINA 11 (1967).

25. Doremus v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 242 S.C. 123, 150-51, 130 S.E.2d
370, 383 (1963).
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is properly qualified and his opinions are properly founded on
a solid base of physical evidence and scientific analysis, he may
give his opinion of speed. This view of the case is supported
by the court's notation later in the opinion that "[t]he admission
of testimony of a traffic expert establishing the relationship
between tire and skid marks and speed ...
26

has met with almost

universal approval.1
The second aspect of this opinion which must be noted is
that Captain Fallaw's testimony was treated as evidence of an
out-of-court experiment. The court quoted from McDowell v.
Floyd2 7 which sets forth the requirements for the admission
of such experiments, and concluded that Captain Fallaw's tests
were conducted under conditions substantially similar to those in
question and, therefore, satisfied the requirements for admissibility. Certainly Captain Fallaw's testimony was evidence of
an experiment and should have been considered as such, but
this fact raises several questions about future litigation which
will be noted below.
0. The Uncertainties
The first question which naturally results from an examination
of Doremus concerns the qualifications which a member of the
highway patrol must have in order to offer opinions. Captain
Fallaw was probably the most highly qualified man in the state
in the area of traffic safety. He had been intimately involved
with the Driver Education Program for eighteen years, making
tests and studies, and lecturing on the subject. He had a statewide reputation as an expert in the field. It follows that if this
case sets a precedent for qualification it is quite high. The
question raised, therefore, is what lesser qualifications if any
would the court accept?. The case of 'Watson 'v. Aiken,,28 decided
several months after Doremus, indicates a willingness to accept
something less and also infers a new judicial awareness of the
publications issued by the highway department concerning speed
and stopping distances. 20 The trial judge in this case had overruled a motion for a non-suit based on his belief that skid
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 151, 130 S.E.2d at 384.
240 S.C. 158, 125 S.E2d 4 (1962).
243 S.C. 368, 133 S.E.2d 833 (1963).
In Smith v. Hardy, 228 S.C. 112, 88 S.E2d 865 (1955), the court refused

to admit a chart showing braking distances contained in the South Carolina
Driver's Handbook.
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marks of seventy feet, four inches indicated an unreasonable
speed. In reversing the supreme court said:
There was no testimony that an automobile such as defendant's can be braked to a stop from a speed of 40 miles
per hour in a lesser distance than 70 feet, 4 inches, nor is
this established by the ordinary experience of mankind.
Therefore, there is no support in the record for an inference
resting on the length of the skid marks that defendant was
driving at a speed in excess of that testified to by the only
witness on the point. To illustrate the fallacy of inferring
excessive speed from skid marks, without some evidence
as to the braking distance required to stop a vehicle from
the speed otherwise indicated by the evidence, see charts in
Am. Jur. (2d) Desk Book, particularly Document No. 173,
pg. 453, which is the chart published by the South Carolina
Highway Department.3 0
This statement implies that evidence of skid marks should be
accompanied by some form of expert interpretation and that
had someone offered this interpretation, even though he was not
so highly qualified as Captain Fallaw, his testimony would have
been relevant.
Looking to other jurisdictions as a source of guidance reveals
a wide range of qualifications based either on experience in
accident investigation, or formal training, or both. The majority
of the cases are careful to point out that the qualifications of
an expert are to be determined by the trial judge and will not
be overturned unless shown to be clearly erroneous. 31 Professor
Wigmore would leave the decision entirely to the trial judge
and eliminate review entirely.32
The following examples are representative of the caliber of
experts who have testified:
(1) A highway patrolman with ten years experience who
had studied physical evidence at the Northwestern Traffic Institute, attended highway patrol courses, and personally conducted tests of speed and skid marks.33
(2) A highway patrolman with fifteen years experience in
30. Watson v. Aiken, 243 S.C. 368, 372, 133 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1963).
31. E.g., Gray v. Woods, 84 Ariz. 87, 324 P.2d 220 (1958).
32. 2 J. WIGmo1m, EVIDENc § 561 (3d ed. 1940).

33. Cherry v. State Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 181 Kan. 205, 310 P2d 907 (1957).
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who had attended refresher courses on
accident investigation
34
the subject.

(3) A patrolman with five and one-half years experience
who had investigated many accidents.3 5
(4) A patrolman with twenty-two years experience who had
studied physical evidence at Northwestern, made personal tests
of speed using skid marks, and who was a qualified instructor
on the subject.3"
(5) A patrolman with two years experience who had completed accident training at the patrol academy, been assigned
to a senior7 officer for added training, and investigated many
3
accidents.
This brief sampling indicates that most courts feel that a
man of some experience will be more qualified than the average
juror and that his estimates will be of value in reaching a conelusion-the degree of his qualification being a matter of weight
rather than admissibility. Since the South Carolina cases have
been concerned only with highway patrolmen as experts, this
discussion has been confined to that category. It should be
pointed out, however, that in other states the experts have
included police officers,3 8 engineers,8 9 safety experts, 40 and
others.
A second problem raised in the Doremus case which is closely
related to the area of qualification, revolves about the fact that
Captain Fallaw personally conducted the tests upon which his
testimony was based. Does this mean therefore, that admissibility
hinges on personal involvement with such tests? Obviously
not every patrolman with accident investigation experience has
conducted his own tests; his knowledge comes from formal training, study, and general investigative experience. The cases
outside South Carolina do not suggest that this is a necessary
qualification. Would our court then accept opinions from a
patrolman who uses as a basis for his calculations his own general experience, formal training, plus recognized published data,
34. Groninger & King v. T.I.M.E. Freight Inc., 384 P.2d 39 (Okla. 1963).
35. Johnson v. Battles, 255 Ala. 624, 52 So. 2d 702 (1951).
36. Nisi v. Checker Cab Co., 171 Neb. 49, 105 N.W.2d 523 (1960).
37. Gray v. Woods, 84 Ariz. 87, 324 P.2d 220 (1958).
38. E.g., Benyon v. Cuthbert, 390 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
39. E.g., Storbakken v. Soderberg, 246 Minn. 434, 75 N.W.2d 496 (1956).

40. E.g., St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Jackson, 242 Ark. 858, 416 S.W2d
273 (1967).
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including perhaps those compiled by Captain Fallaw. In this
way his personal qualifications would be aimed at attesting to
such things as the similarity of the road conditions, the possible
unknown factors or peculiarities of the particular case, if any,
and the reliability of the data he uses. Some support for this
proposition is contained in that portion of the Watson opinion
quoted above which refers to the chart published by the South
Carolina Highway Department.41 In Taylor v. Johnson,42 a
recent Utah case, the court allowed officers to give their opinion
of speed based on skid marks using precalculated charts as a
part of their testimony. It was stipulated that the charts were
accurate and reliable and that the officers were experienced in
accident investigation. A contrary decision was reached in
Mississippi in Gray v. Turner43 where the court declared that
a chart used by a city police officer was hearsay. In this case
though, the officer's testimony was based solely on the chart.
He had not qualified as an expert, was not familiar with the
mathematical or physical factors involved in determining the
speed-skid mark relationship, and it was not shown that the
conditions of the accident corresponded to those used in making
the chart. Even though the chart was thrown out, the case
does point up the need for expert qualifications when a chart
is used. The case of Cherry ,v. State Automobile Insurance Association4 4 is also interesting in that an expert was allowed to
give an opinion of speed based upon the length of skid marks
shown in a picture.
On the basis of the cases cited throughout this paper which
have admitted opinion evidence it seems safe to assert that
South Carolina would allow properly qualified highway patrolmen to offer opinon testimony which is partly based on
acceptable highway department data concerning the speed-skid
mark relationship. 45 Additional support for the presumption
is afforded by that body of evidence law which allows testimony
based on scientific works, books, and formulas.4 6
41. Watson v. Aiken, 243 S.C. 368, 372, 133 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1963).

42. Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 16, 414 P.2d 575 (1966).
43. 245 Miss. 65, 145 So. 2d 470 (1962).

44. 181 Kan. 205, 310 P.2d 907 (1957).
45. 2 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 665 (3d ed. 1940).
46. Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 287 (1964).
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III. OPINIONS OF SPEED BASED ON THE CONDITION
OF TH VEmciaLs
Opinions of speed based upon the damage done to the vehicles
have not been so widely accepted as those based on the speedskid mark relationship. The cases dealing with this method indicate that frequently, although the condition of the vehicle after
impact may have been the primary source of interpretation, other
factors such as the position of the cars, the amount of debris
scattered about,47road damage, and the like were also included in
the calculation.
In those cases which have rejected this evidence 48 it is frequently difficult to determine whether the method was being
rejected per se, or whether there was simply a lack of evidence
in the particular case upon which to base an opinion. However,
the most frequent objections are that the opinion is not shown
to be based on any scientific or technical principle4 9 and that a
multitude of variables or unknown factors can affect the accuracy of the calculation.Y° A good example of the latter was
suggested in Stephanofsky v. Hil151 in which the court pointed

out that the impact of the collision could have jammed the
accelerator, thereby rendering the conditions after impact a poor
basis for determining speed before the collision.
Still, some jurisdictions have allowed opinion testimony based
on vehicle condition, reasoning that experts are better qualified to make determinations on this basis than jurors and that
any uncertainties about the method should bear on the weight
of the testimony rather than its admissibilty.
IV.

CONcLUSION

South Carolina has joined with the majority of jurisdictions
and allowed expert opinions of speed based upon skid marks. Exactly what degree of expertise will be required or under what circumstances the evidence will be allowed is still largely a matter
47. E.g., Baggett v. Allen, 273 Ala. 164, 137 So. 2d 37 (1962) ; Stephanofsky
v. Hill, 136 Conn. 379, 71 A.2d 560 (1950) ; Standard Motor Co. v. Blood, 380
S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Grasty v. Tanner, 206 Va. 723, 146
S.E.2d 252 (1966).
48. E.g., Flores v. Barlow, 354 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
49. Grasty v. Tanner, 206 Va. 723, 146 S.E2d 252 (1966).
50. 136 Conn. 379, 71 A.2d 560 (1950).
51. White v. Zutell, 263 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1959); Davis v. Ward, 219 Cal.
App. 2d 144, 32 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1963); Massey v. Stephens, 113 Ga. App.
10, 147 S.E.2d 53 (1966); Johnson v. Huskey, 186 Kan. 282, 350 P.2d 14
(1960).
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of conjecture; but, all indications are that highway patrolmen
will be allowed to give opinion testimony in future accident
cases even though the conditions are not as ideal as they were in
Doremus. If such a policy is followed by our court it could have
a significant impact on the future litigation of accident cases.
C. E. MoDoNmz, JR.
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